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By Dr Angus Law, Dr Graham Spinardi, Dr Rory Hadden and Dr Stephen Welch 
School of Engineering, The University of Edinburgh 
1. Introduction 
This document provides a collective response from several University of Edinburgh 
academics to the questions posed as part of Dame Judith Hackitt’s Call for Evidence, 
Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety. The University of Edinburgh has been an 
internationally leading centre for fire safety engineering research and education since the 
mid 1970s, and was the first institution globally to offer masters degrees in this discipline (in 
1974). The fire safety engineering group at Edinburgh currently comprises 9 academic staff 
and more than 25 full time PhD students. 
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1.1. Format of this Document 
The scope of Dame Judith’s review is specific to making “recommendations to ensure a 
sufficiently robust regulatory system for the future and to provide further assurance to 
residents that the buildings they live in are safe and will remain so”.  
 
We have reviewed the questions in detail. Each question raises multiple complex issues in 
terms of the interaction of the regulatory system with technical and societal issues. For this 
reason, we believe that the most coherent way to address these questions is to provide a 
discussion of the background and context to each of the key issues, and from this identify 
any recommendations.  
 
In addition, it is worth noting that we have limited our commentary to those areas where we 
feel that we have insight gained from our combined academic research, educational 
activities, and first-hand professional experience.  
 
Some of the questions are in areas that, while we may have opinions, we believe that our 
knowledge is insufficient to make a formal submission of evidence. Similarly, there are 
areas where we feel that other voices in the sector have a significantly stronger claim to 
authoritative knowledge. In these areas, we have refrained from making comment. 
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2. About the Authors 
To respond to the questions raised by review, it is necessary to make strong knowledge 
claims about the regulatory system and its practical operation. Inevitably, therefore, each of 
the authors of this document are, in some way, a function of (and a part of) the system 
under analysis. In the interests of disclosure, and allowing the reader to form a view on the 
credibility and rigour of the authors’ respective knowledge claims, the following paragraphs 
provide descriptions of the authors’ backgrounds. 
 
Dr Angus Law. BRE Lecturer in Fire Safety Engineering at the University of Edinburgh. Dr 
Law graduated with a degree in Civil Engineering at the University of Edinburgh in 2007; he 
graduated with a PhD in Fire Safety Engineering from the University of Edinburgh in 2010. 
Dr Law worked as a Fire Engineer for Ove Arup and Partners in their Leeds office from 
2010-2014. He worked as a Lecturer at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, from 2014-
2016, joining the University of Edinburgh in December 2016; Dr Law’s current position is 
therefore part funded by BRE Trust. Dr Law is a Chartered Fire Engineer (2014) with the 
Institution of Fire Engineers. 
 
Dr Graham Spinardi. Ove Arup Foundation/Royal Academy of Engineering Senior 
Research Fellow in Integrating Technical and Social Aspects of Fire Safety Engineering 
and Expertise since 2013. After a first degree in Ecological Science, he was awarded a 
PhD in the Sociology of Technology (The Development of Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology 
from Polaris to Trident) in 1988. Following a year at Stanford University, his subsequent 
research and teaching at the University of Edinburgh has dealt with issues of regulation, 
testing, technological ‘lock-in’, and the role of politics and organisational interests in a wide 
range of technological areas. His post is part funded by the Ove Arup Foundation. 
 
Dr Rory Hadden. Rushbrook Senior Lecturer in Fire Investigation at the University of 
Edinburgh. He graduated in 2007 with an MEng in Chemical Engineering and in 2011 with a 
PhD in Fire Safety Engineering from the University of Edinburgh. He subsequently held 
postdoctoral research positions at the University of Western Ontario and Imperial College 
London before joining the University of Edinburgh as academic staff in 2013. His research 
has focussed on advancing the understanding of the ignition, flame spread, and burning of 
solid fuels. 
 
Dr Stephen Welch. Senior Lecturer in Computational Methods for Fire Safety Engineering. 
Dr Welch has a PhD in combustion and over 20 years of experience in fire research and 
teaching. He worked for nearly a decade at BRE's Fire Research Station, with involvement 
in various full-scale fire test programmes at BRE Cardington, before joining the BRE Centre 
for Fire Safety Engineering at the University of Edinburgh as a Lecturer in 2004. His main 
teaching is related to fire safety engineering practice, providing a training in engineering 
approaches to applied problems, with critique and analysis of relevant regulations, codes 
and design principles, delivered to honours year and postgraduate students. He is 
Discipline Programme Manager for Civil & Environmental Engineering and Programme 
Director for the taught postgraduate degree in Structural & Fire Safety Engineering. 
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3. Legal Framework and Overall Context 
In England & Wales, The Building Regulations 2010 control new buildings (or alterations), 
and the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 controls the occupation and operation 
of existing buildings. The link between these two pieces of legislation is “Regulation 38” 
which requires that, on completion, Fire Safety Information should be passed from the 
designer to the occupier. 
 
Approved Document B provides practical guidance on how to meet the requirements of Part 
B of The Building Regulations, and a suite of “Fire Safety Risk Assessment” documents 
provides guidance about the requirements of the Regulatory Reform Order (RRO) and how 
to conduct “suitable and sufficient” risk assessments. 
 
The logical structure of the legislation framework is clear and consistent; however, the 
degree to which it is successfully implemented is related to the competency and 
understanding of those responsible for doing so. This level of competency is highly variable 
across the different organisations, professions, and trades involved in the delivery of fire 
safety in the built environment. Consequently, while existing guidance (and legislative 
responsibilities) may be clear to those with a high level of competence – there is potential 
benefit in making some changes to the regulatory framework (and accreditation of 
professional disciplines) to mitigate the impact of lack of awareness or inadequate 
competence. 
3.1. The Building Regulations (England & Wales) 
The Building Regulations define the meaning of building work and establish the 
requirements that any building work should achieve. The requirements are expressed as 
“functional” statements about the necessary standard of performance that a building should 
achieve. Functional requirements use terms such as “reasonable”, “appropriate”, and 
“adequate”. This generality allows the regulations to be interpreted for specific applications; 
adequate fire safety measures will vary depending on the building and other aspects of 
context, including assumed occupant behaviours. For example, it may be inappropriate to 
provide the same fire safety measures in a hospital as those which are provided in an 
agricultural shed.  
 
Approved Document B (ADB) is provided under the powers granted by the Building Act 
1984 to provide practical guidance with respect to the requirements of The Building 
Regulations. The document provides guidance for “more common building situations”, and 
highlights that many of the fire safety provisions within the document are closely interlinked. 
 
The measures in ADB are derived from the functional requirements of The Building 
Regulations. A more detailed set of expectations are provided regarding the intent of the 
fire safety measures within a building, and there is detailed “prescriptive” guidance about 
how the requirements can be met. 
 
ADB does not identify solutions for every possible permutation of building type or 
arrangement. Instead, the reader is expected to understand the document’s intent, and to 
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interpret the guidance on the basis of this intent. If a reader is uncertain regarding the 
meaning of a clause (or encounters a situation that does not fit within the prescriptive 
guidance), then they should carefully consider and evaluate the fundamental intent of the 
document, as regards fulfilling the functional requirements of the Building Regulations. 
Therefore, irrespective of “the letter” of the guidance (i.e. ADB), there is an expectation that 
the reader is will follow the “spirit” of the document and will apply reasonable skill and care 
in undertaking their design work. 
 
This approach to regulation is intended to be “fail safe” in that any lack of clarity within the 
guidance is clarified based on knowledge of the overall intent. Furthermore, this approach 
has the advantage that any new product, material, or system that does not exactly fit within 
the existing guidance must be evaluated on the basis of the overall intent. The document 
does not therefore have to be updated to prohibit (or allow) new products, materials or 
systems. 
 
The use of the Approved Document therefore requires the reader to be familiar with the 
measures described in the guidance, the overall intent of the document, the manner in 
which the measures described in each section are interlinked, and the cases where the 
prescriptive guidance may not apply.  
3.1.1. International Approaches to Building Regulation 
The functional approach to fire safety regulation that is adopted within the UK1 is not the 
only approach to regulating fire safety within the Built Environment. Three alternative 
approaches are discussed in the following sections; these represent exemplars of important 
variants. 
 
NFPA 101, Code for Safety to Life from Fire in Buildings and Structures 
 
NFPA 101 is a building code that is prepared by the National Fire Protection Association 
(based in the USA). Unlike the Approved Document, NFPA 101 is not prepared by a 
government, and therefore has no inherent legal status. Instead, jurisdictions (i.e. individual 
states) may choose to cite NFPA 101 as a means for achieving regulatory compliance. 
 
The Code has stated objectives relating to the protection of life, and is primarily based 
around prescriptive provisions (rules). NFPA 101 states that compliance with these rules 
will necessarily achieve the objectives of The Code. Within this statement lies the key 
difference between the regulatory approach adopted in the UK, and the approach adopted 
by the NFPA. Unlike the UK approach, NFPA makes no requirement for any practitioner to 
consider the appropriateness of any solution for a given scenario. 
 
To mitigate for the rigidity with which the rules must be applied, NFPA provides a high level 
of specificity with respect to different occupancies, and how the rules must be applied in 
                                            
1 Despite various differences, the Building (Scotland) Regulations have a similar “functional” 
structure to the regulations in England & Wales. Northern Ireland is not included within this 
review. For the purpose of this section England & Wales and Scotland will be referred to as 
UK. 
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different situations. Consequently, adherence to the rules provided within NFPA 101 
requires a high level of knowledge and competence in navigating the document. A reflection 
of this is the fact that within the USA the specialist appointed to assist the design team is 
frequently referred to as a “Code Consultant”. 
 
The regulatory system that is embodied by NFPA 101 has some key features which 
contrast it with the UK approach. Primarily these relate to the competence of the individuals 
who implement and regulate the application of The Code. Although it is not a trivial exercise 
to read and implement The Code, there is no requirement for the practitioner to critically 
evaluate the validity of any solution provided by The Code in the context of their building. 
Hence, so long as the rules are followed correctly, the practitioner holds no liability (or legal 
responsibility) for the safety of the building. There is no necessity for any practitioner to 
have a fundamental understanding of the relevant fire phenomena, wider fire safety 
engineering issues, or how unconventional design proposals may affect the validity of the 
Code solution. Consequently, this approach to regulation may lead to the deskilling of the 
profession in terms of its ability to critically analyse code solutions in the context of the key 
phenomena associated with fire safety. The responsibility for safety therefore tends to shift 
to the regulator, and any ambiguities of The Code are the fault of the regulator. 
 
Building Code of Australia (NCC BCA) 
 
The Building Code of Australia (BCA) is adopted within each of the states in Australia. It is 
prepared as a consortium between Federal Government, State Government and industry. It 
is adopted by State level legislation as the regulatory framework for new buildings. 
 
The BCA is a hybrid of the UK approach (functional requirements) and the NFPA approach 
(prescriptive provisions). The BCA functional requirements are broadly similar to those 
described within Schedule 1 of the Building Regulations. The prescriptive provisions are 
termed “deemed to satisfy” (DtS) provisions, and if these provisions are followed, the code 
assumes that the legislative requirements are met. Consequently, the DtS provisions are 
philosophically equivalent to the rules within NFPA 101.  
 
In parallel with the DtS provisions, the presence of functional objectives allows practitioners 
to deviate from the rules. If a practitioner wishes to propose an alternative solution, then 
they can do this by providing an engineering justification to demonstrate that the functional 
objectives are met. However, unlike the UK system there is no explicit imperative for the 
practitioner to consider the validity (or otherwise) of the DtS provisions. Hence, there is 
nothing within the system that ensures that it is “fail safe”. If a practitioner believes that a 
DtS is unsafe or inappropriate, then there is no legal mechanism to require them to adopt a 
different solution. 
 
New Zealand Verification Methods 
 
Within New Zealand, a hybrid system also exists. The Building Code (BC) sets out 
mandatory requirements. These requirements can be achieved by either following 
prescriptive rules (known as Accepted Solutions) or by the use of Verification Methods 
(VMs) to check the adequacy of a proposed solution. 
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The intent of a verification method is to ensure that engineering methodologies (e.g. 
modelling, or detailed analysis of a particular situation) have pre-agreed inputs and outputs. 
The intent is to allow approval authorities to easily check whether the proposed values are 
appropriate and therefore to expedite the design process, provide consistency between 
regional approval authorities, and ensure that practitioners are held to a minimum agreed 
standard. 
 
The reason for the implementation of this system was that there was (previously) concern 
that there was insufficient competency amongst partitioners and regulators to independently 
define and agree appropriate criteria. However, it is the experience of the authors that this 
system has, instead, resulted in a further drop in the level of competence required to 
undertake (and check) fire safety engineering design within New Zealand. Practitioners are 
no longer formally required to think about the appropriateness of any solutions – they can 
simply adopt the VMs irrespective of whether this provides an appropriate solution. 
3.1.2. Enforcement of The Building Regulations (England & Wales) 
The Building Regulations require that a named individual is responsible for making a formal 
submission. It is likely that for a complex project this individual would be a member of the 
professional design team2. This individual is also required to ensure that the fire safety 
information is communicated to the “responsible person” under the RRO (as discussed 
further in section 3.2.2). 
 
The regulator is responsible for taking such steps as are reasonable to enable them to be 
satisfied within the limits of professional skill and care that the requirements of The Building 
Regulations have been met. The regulator is also required to consult the Fire and Rescue 
Service (FRS) in relation to the submission. As part of this consultation, the regulator “shall 
have regard to any views they express”. Therefore, it should be noted that the FRS is 
consultative body, not an “approval” body, within the English system. 
 
The practitioner is therefore responsible for ensuring that the requirements of the 
regulations have been met; the regulator (Local Authority Building Control or Approved 
Inspector) is responsible for taking reasonable steps to check whether the regulations have 
been met; the FRS has the opportunity to provide “views” about the proposed solution. 
 
This approach means that the ultimate responsibility for the compliance (or otherwise) of a 
building rests with the applicant. There is therefore no guarantee that a building that has 
been “approved” by the regulator actually complies with the requirements of the regulations. 
It would be unreasonable to expect the regulator to check every component in every part of 
a building – consequently it is appropriate that the ultimate responsibility (and liability) rests 
with the applicant. 
                                            
2  In this document, reference is made to the professional design team. This term is 
intended to encompass anybody involved in the process of developing or specifying the 
design. Once a design has been specified, it must also be constructed. The design and 
construction are separate processes, but frequently there is considerable overlap as 
contractors may make changes to the design specification.  
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The degree to which all aspects of building work meet the requirements of The Building 
Regulations is therefore a function, primarily, of the competence of the applicant and, by 
association, the wider professional and construction team. Nevertheless, if aspects of the 
proposed scheme are unsatisfactory, a competent regulator may be able to identify this and 
ensure that appropriate changes are made. 
 
Competence within the regulatory bodies is therefore a critical factor in mitigating the effect 
of poor practice within the industry. Further, if regulatory bodies are known to have a high 
level of competence, then incompetent practitioners will naturally find it difficult operate 





It is recommended that the current Building Regulations framework and associated 
guidance documents should be retained. 
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3.2. The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 
Section 3.2 has been drafted by Dr Graham Spinardi based on the research of Jim Baker3 
 
The post-construction operation and occupation of buildings is regulated under the 
Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. The post-construction phase is important 
because buildings and their usage can change significantly over a building’s lifetime, which 
can last many decades, if not centuries. Deliberate changes in usage and material 
alteration of the building results in the building becoming subject to re-approval in 
accordance with The Building Regulations. Other, more incremental, changes can also 
have significant impact on fire safety. Some fire safety systems may naturally degrade over 
time whereas others may be affected, and impaired, by the actions of occupants or others 
with access to the building.  
 
The primary purpose of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, which is 
applicable to most buildings (in England and Wales) other than domestic premises, is to 
ensure that fire risks have been properly assessed and suitable precautions, including the 
maintenance of equipment and planning for evacuation, have been taken. This implies that 
the fire safety design approved under the Building Regulations remains functional and 
appropriate as the building ages. 
 
The main mechanism of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 is one of self-
regulation by the “responsible person”. Where a workplace is concerned, the responsible 
person is the employer “if the workplace is to any extent under his control”; otherwise, it is 
“the person who has control of the premises” for the purpose of a business or other activity 
or the owner of the premises. 
3.2.1. The Role of the Responsible Person 
The responsible person is required to carry out a number of duties to ensure the provision 
of “general fire precautions” for employees or other relevant persons. The most 
fundamental duty of the responsible person is to carry out a risk assessment (typically 
referred to as the “fire risk assessment”) that should provide “a suitable and sufficient 
assessment of the risks to which relevant persons are exposed for the purpose of 
identifying the general fire precautions he needs to take”. Such an assessment must be 
                                            
3 Jim Baker is a former firefighter serving with both West Midlands Fire Service and 
Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service. A portion of his service was spent dealing with fire 
safety regulation as an Inspecting Officer under the Fire Precautions Act 1971. Since 
leaving the Fire and Rescue Service in 2007, Jim has studied fire safety at the University of 
Central Lancashire, Loughborough University, and the University of Edinburgh where he is 
currently studying for a PhD in Sociology. His PhD study, investigating the sociological 
aspects of post-construction fire safety in the UK, is being funded by the Department of 
Science, Technology and Innovation Studies, which is part of the School of Social and 
Political Science at the University of Edinburgh. Jim is a graduate of the Institution of Fire 
Engineers and a chartered member of the Institute of Occupational Safety and Health. 
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reviewed and kept up to date if “there is reason to suspect it is no longer valid” or “there has 
been a significant change in the matters to which it relates”.  
 
This regulatory system thus relies on self-regulation whereby the responsible person must 
be aware that they have that legal role, and they must also know what constitutes a 
“suitable and sufficient” assessment for their premises, and whether any changes are so 
significant as to require the assessment to be reviewed. The responsible person can carry 
out the risk assessment if they have “sufficient training and experience or knowledge”, and 
the government provides guidance to assist the responsible person in carrying out their 
duties for a range of common types of premises, but warns that a responsible person who 
feels “unable to apply the guidance … should seek expert advice from a competent person” 
(DCLG 2006, 4). Moreover, it is noted that: “More complex premises will probably need to 
be assessed by a person who has comprehensive training or experience in fire risk 
assessment” (DCLG 2006, 4). 
 
There is therefore a requirement for the responsible person to make judgments about 
whether they possess “sufficient training and experience or knowledge” to carry out their 
duties, what amounts to a “suitable and sufficient” risk assessment for a particular 
premises, and whether a premises is complex or not. In principle, this amounts to a logical 
flaw in the regulation because the responsible person may not have sufficient expertise to 
know whether an expert fire risk assessor is needed. 
 
The other main task of the responsible person is to make “fire safety arrangements … for 
the effective planning, organisation, control, monitoring and review of the preventive and 
protective measures”. In addition to a well-planned and rehearsed evacuation strategy, 
these arrangements will include a number of material aspects of the premises including the 
presence of smoke alarms, other detectors, and of fire fighting equipment, and the 
functionality of evacuation routes. Some of these measures can be visually inspected, but 
ensuring all relevant fire safety systems and procedures are appropriately maintained may 
require access to the relevant design information accumulated during the design and 
approval stage of the project.  
3.2.2. Fire Safety Design Information 
Regulation 38 of The Building Regulations 2010 requires that the “person carrying out the 
work shall give fire safety information to the responsible person not later than the date of 
completion of the work, or the date of occupation of the building or extension, whichever is 
the earlier”. Although not part of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, 
Regulation 38 is an important element of post-construction regulation because it is the only 
provision for ensuring the transfer of fire safety design information from the design team to 
the building users. However, there are a number of problematic aspects to this regulatory 
mechanism. 
 
First, there is no guidance provided as to the format and content of the fire safety 
information that should be transferred. On the one hand, the fire safety information should 
contain all details relevant to enabling the safe future occupation and maintenance of the 
building, but, on the other hand, it should be comprehensible to the likely responsible 
person (which for some buildings may be someone with little technical background in fire 
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safety). A level of competence is therefore required on both sides by (1) the designer to 
identify and collate the relevant information for the responsible person; and (2) the 
responsible person to receive, and interpret, and make use of the fire safety information. 
 
Second, the requirement to transfer the information on the completion of the work (which 
would usually be before building occupation) is often impractical because the responsible 
person may not yet be in situ at that time. While the Scottish legislation stipulates that the 
fire safety information (known in Scotland as the “fire safety design summary”) should, 
along with the building completion certificate, be lodged with the local building control on 
the completion of the work, there is no such requirement in England & Wales. Instead, in 
England & Wales, Building Control or an Approved Inspector simply require the project 
developer to confirm that they have provided the fire safety information (by signing a 
declaration on a form) without checking its contents or that it has reached the responsible 
person. 
 
Thus, despite what Regulation 38 requires, the fire safety information provided by the 
design team rarely lands in the hands of the responsible person, and there is no regulatory 
oversight mechanism to ensure that it does so. The fire safety information documentation 
may be left in the building on completion, but, typically, it is not located and used thereafter 
for the purposes for which it was intended. This may not be a problem for simple buildings 
or for those that are strictly designed according to prescriptive guidelines, where the 
functioning of the fire safety design will be familiar to an experienced practitioner and can 
be inferred from readily available public documentation (e.g. Approved Document B). 
However, without the fire safety information it would not necessarily be clear whether the 
fire safety design was fully prescriptive or whether some element of fire safety engineering 
had been used. Where fire safety designs have involved extensive fire safety engineering it 
may be essential for the fire safety information to be used in any fire risk assessment. 
 
The value of the fire safety information thus depends on it being available and containing 
the appropriate information in a way that is comprehensible to the person carrying out the 
fire risk assessment for the building. It also of course depends on the competency of that 
person. 
3.2.3. Competency of Fire Risk Assessors 
Although the responsible person bears ultimate responsibility for carrying out a risk 
assessment and ensuring the provision of fire precautions, they can employ a specialist fire 
risk assessor to do this. Competence to do this is defined as follows: “A person is to be 
regarded as competent [to assist the responsible person in carrying out their duties] where 
he has sufficient training and experience or knowledge and other qualities to enable him 
properly to assist in undertaking the preventative and protective measures”. 
 
However, such a definition of competence is not helpful if the responsible person does not 
themselves have the competence to judge whether a fire risk assessor has “sufficient” 
training, experience or knowledge. Assurance of competence could be provided by 
registration with a relevant professional body or certification by an accredited certification 
body, but neither is currently necessary to operate as a fire risk assessor. Moreover, there 
is no overall body that regulates the standards provided by these certification bodies, and 
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perceptions of what combination of education and experience constitute competence vary 
widely within the industry.  
3.2.4. Enforcement of Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 
The shift in post-construction fire safety regulation brought about by the Regulatory Reform 
(Fire Safety) Order 2005 parallels what was already in place for Health & Safety, with the 
exception being that enforcement is to be carried out by the Fire and Rescue Service rather 
than the Health & Safety Executive (with some exceptions such as nuclear installations). As 
with Health & Safety requirements, many premises are not inspected to check whether they 
are complying with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. Enforcement is 
focused on those premises that are considered higher risk. 
 
This judgment of the risk presented by particular premises is made locally by a FRS using 
what is known in England as Integrated Risk Management Planning (IRMP). Many 
premises are thus not inspected because they are not considered to present a great 
enough risk, although what evidence there is (for example, as discovered when the fire 
services are called to a fire) suggests that many premises either have not been subjected to 
a fire risk assessment and/or do not have appropriate fire precautions in place (with a 
common failing being evacuation routes that are blocked or even locked). 
 
The problem with this inspection approach is that it relies heavily on statistical analysis of 
previous deaths expressed as “societal life risk”. The IRMP approach to risk-based 
inspection relies on historical data of fire outcomes to provide “generic levels of relative risk” 
for different occupancy types (DCLG 2009, 5). A “relative risk score” for individual buildings 
can then be calculated using local knowledge “based on the extent to which an individual 
building moves away from the generic level of relative risk for that occupancy” (DCLG 2009, 
5). A type of building that has not seen many deaths in recent years may thus not be a high 
priority for inspection, even if close inspection and analysis of the fire safety measures in 
those buildings might have raised concerns. 
 
In addition to using historical statistics, societal life risk data can also “be assessed by 
carrying out a site visit” (DCLG 2009, 3). However, these site visits are carried out by Fire 
and Rescue Service personnel whose expertise and experience will typically limit their 
capacity to uncover some potential serious breaches of the fire safety precautions required 
under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. Although many failings can be 
observed during a “walk through” inspection (e.g. evacuation routes blocked or locked, fire 
doors propped open, debris in stairwells) other fire safety issues may require more intrusive 
investigation, and specialist knowledge of fire safety engineering. 
 
Moreover, although the principles embodied in the regulatory mechanism of the Regulatory 
Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 follow those that have been in place for Health & Safety 
since the 1970s, there are key differences that impact on the effectiveness of enforcement 
measures. The most dangerous Health & Safety risks are clearly identifiable and linked with 
particular business practices. Any organisation using these processes will have relevant 
specialist expertise, and those organisations with significant risk will be known to, and 
inspected by, the Health & Safety Executive. In many cases (e.g. the nuclear, chemical, 
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It is recommended that: 
• Regulation 38 should be strengthened to ensure that it is made available and used in 
the fire risk assessment and by FRS enforcement officers. Regulation 38 should 
therefore be explicitly referenced in an updated Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) 
Order. A standard format for the fire safety design information should be used, and if 
possible (with regard to confidentiality restrictions imposed by the use of Approved 
Inspectors) this design information should be lodged in a public repository.  
• Fire risk assessments should be submitted to the relevant FRS. 
• There should be a national registration organisation (e.g. paralleling Gas Safe) that 
fire risk assessors are required to be registered with, with appropriate training, 
accreditation, certification, and on-going CPD requirements. 
• It should be ensure that the scope of the risk assessment includes any aspects of 
the building that may affect the provision of General Fire Precautions. 
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4.  Role Understanding and Competency 
The previous sections demonstrate how the allocation of legal responsibility is clear within 
the various documents, although some clarifications of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) 
Order are desirable. Furthermore, it has been described how the existing regulatory 
framework within the UK requires practitioners and occupiers to take responsibility for 
ensuring the requirements of the legislation are met. 
 
In the case of the RRO, it has been highlighted that the responsible person may not be 
aware that they have a defined role as the responsible person. This individual must be 
competent to receive and make use of the Fire Safety Information, and, where they make 
use of an external fire risk assessor, to ensure that their appointed “competent person” is, 
indeed, competent. 
 
In the case of The Building Regulations, it has been highlighted that ultimate responsibility 
for compliance with the requirements rests with the applicant (and their professional team). 
Absence of competence within the professional team can be mitigated by competence 
within the regulator. 
 
Therefore, fundamental to ensuring adequate implementation of the legal framework is the 
reliance on the professional competence of the various parties. This section of the evidence 
will discuss the requisite competence for the various stakeholders, and the degree to which 
the parties achieve this. 
4.1. Professional Design Team 
In the case of the professional design team, responsibility for ensuring that requirements 
relating to fire safety were achieved has historically been held by the architect. The 
architect would read and apply the relevant guidance without significant deviation. 
Historically, building systems were sufficiently simple that it was feasible for the architect 
(who had little or no specialist fire safety engineering knowledge) to adequately interpret the 
relevant rules and guidance.  
 
In the contemporary construction industry, however, there has been an increase in the 
complexity of building systems and there is often a desire for unusual forms (e.g. atria, 
extensive open plan areas, etc.). Consequently, the architect is often no longer competent 
to interpret the guidance and ensure that all of the requirements are adequately met. As a 
result, fire safety specialists frequently form part of the professional services team during 
the design phase; the principle consultant receives advice from the fire safety specialists to 
assist them in ensuring that the requirements of The Building Regulations are met. There 
are some inherent challenges with this arrangement.  
 
If the principle consultant is reliant on a fire safety specialist to ensure compliance with the 
requirements, then they may also lack the ability to assess the quality of the information 
provided by the consultant. When appointing the consultant, it becomes of paramount 
importance that there should be a metric by which the principle consultant can evaluate the 
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competence of potential fire safety specialists, particularly in the UK where “engineer” is not 
a legally protected term (as e.g. in the USA or Canada). 
 
Across the industry, there is no agreed metric of competence. An obvious metric would be 
the specialist’s track record of previous work. However, the comparatively infrequent 
occurrence of severe fires in buildings means that a judgement of track record is not a true 
or demonstrable judgment of safety, but a judgement of the consultant’s ability to, for 
example, achieve regulatory approval while minimising cost. 
 
This situation has the potential to lead to a “race to the bottom” whereby competent 
specialists are priced out of the market by cheaper, incompetent, actors operating as fire 
safety engineers in a system with no legal protection or required formal accreditation of this 
professional designation. 
 
In the absence of a defined metric of competence for the professional design team, another 
proxy metric is an individual’s perceived authority. The regulator (i.e. the Local Authority or 
Approved Inspector) have authority over the success (or otherwise) of any building 
regulations application. If this individual is satisfied that a proposed solution is appropriate, 
then no further thought, analysis, or justification is required to obtain approval. Hence within 
the professional design team, the fire safety engineering specialist may find that their 
advice is regarded as secondary to the opinion of the regulator. 
 
This is potentially problematic because the regulator is required to have a wide knowledge 
of all relevant aspects of The Building Regulations. Often, therefore they are not a fire 
specialist, and may not have the competence to identify (or even check) a detailed fire 
safety engineering solution. Furthermore, they may not have the competence to recognise 
where aspects of the prescriptive guidance are not appropriate, since they may not 
understand the assumptions and limitations inherent within the guidance. 
 
This lack of competence within the regulator has two problematic impacts: (1) it reduces the 
technical level of the check that can be completed and, therefore, the ability of the regulator 
to identify inappropriate solutions; (2) when combined with the perceived importance of the 
regulator’s authority, it may lead to the acceptance of solutions on the basis that these can 
be “approved”, rather than because they are necessarily appropriate under the 
circumstances. The latter of these problems has the potential to blur the line between 
designer (who should take responsibility for the design) and regulator (who should check 
the design is adequate). 
4.1.1. The Role of the Fire Service 
Irrespective of the regulator’s competence, the organisation with the most fire safety 
authority within The Building Regulations process is often perceived to be the Fire and 
Rescue Service (FRS). This perception is not unreasonable as the FRS has legal powers 
that relate to the RRO and, of course, has authority over the actions taken to respond to 
any fire incident. In the mind of the public (and many built environment professionals), the 
FRS is therefore the custodian of fire safety. In the absence of a metric for competency 
within the professional services team, the authority of the FRS is an appealing alternative 
metric. 
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A regulator may recognise that they do not have the competence to evaluate a proposed 
fire safety engineering solution. Consequently, they may defer to the FRS’s opinion when 
evaluating any proposed solution. To some degree, this is appropriate; indeed, consulting 
the FRS as part of the process is an explicit recognition that they have expertise 
(particularly in fire-fighting) that the regulator does not. However, when taken to extremes, 
the FRS can become the de facto regulator – and is therefore required to act beyond its 
role as a consultative body, and in some cases, beyond their technical competence.  
 
In response to this, some FRSs have developed in-house fire safety engineering teams 
who can review the details of proposed solutions. These FRSs are effectively performing 
the role of the regulator by effectively recognising that unless they provide a check, there 
would be no effective regulation of the professional design team. By providing these 
services, FRSs are, arguably, attempting to discharge their duties under the Fire Service 
Act 2004 (to make provisions for the purpose of promoting fire safety in their area). 
 
The ability of any FRS to fulfil this role is highly variable depending, for example, on its level 
of resource, and the frequency with which it encounters occasions where such levels of 
competence are required. 
4.1.2. Competency of the Professional Design Team 
It is clear that the competency of the professional design team is fundamental to meeting 
the requirements of the regulations. The checking (whether by regulator or fire service) is a 
method for discouraging incompetence. It is therefore vital that the regulator has adequate 
competency to perform a credible check. If the professional service teams are broadly 
competent, then the identification of inappropriate solutions by the regulator would be an 
occasional circumstance. 
 
Experiential evidence and the widespread issues associated with building cladding that 
have been identified by the post-Grenfell DCLG screening test programme suggest that: 1) 
The professional design team (in its broadest sense) is frequently not competent to meet 
the requirements of The Building Regulations; and 2) The competence of the regulator is 
often not sufficient to identify or rectify this. 
 
To ensure that the requirements have been met, a competent fire safety engineer must: 
understand the letter of the guidance, understand the intent of the guidance, and 
understand the fundamental science and engineering that underpins fire safety. In 
combination, these qualities will allow an individual to follow the guidance as appropriate, 
and also to identify situations where the guidance is not appropriate, and alternative 
solutions (based on fundamental principles) should be adopted.  
 
When a structure is designed, a structural engineer will always be consulted. This is 
because it is recognised that a thorough understanding of the physical principles is 
necessary in order to ensure that any proposed solution is appropriate. Furthermore, the 
structural engineering community has a clearly identifiable metric of competence – the 
professional accreditation of Chartered Structural Engineer. This accreditation is supported 
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by a strong institution and, in the mind of the public, Chartered Structural Engineers are the 
custodians of structural safety within the built environment. 
 
Unlike the Chartered Structural Engineer (who is regarded as a pre-requisite for any 
professional structural engineering), a Chartered Fire Safety Engineer is generally regarded 
as an optional consultant. 
 
The reasons for this are as follows. First, the provision of detailed guidance allows 
individuals to implement the guidance without, necessarily, having an understanding of the 
principles behind that guidance. Consequently, as part of the building design process it is 
not necessary to consult an individual with a thorough understanding of the physical 
principles behind fire safety. The appointment of a specialist only becomes necessary 
where there is a specific need due to a recognised lack of competence, or a difficulty has 
arisen in obtaining the relevant approval from the regulator. 
 
Second, the Chartered Fire Safety Engineer is not widely regarded as the custodian of fire 
safety within the built environment. Instead, the Fire and Rescue Service is perceived to 
occupy this role. This weakens the status of the profession of Chartered Fire Safety 
Engineer (and its professionals) as Fire Safety Engineers are often regarded as having less 
authority than the FRS. This weakening of the profession is compounded by the fact that 
the awarding body for Chartered Fire Engineer status, i.e. the Institution of Fire Engineers 
(IFE) is primarily comprised of current and former fire service personnel, the vast majority of 
whom are not Chartered Fire Engineers.  
 
Fire and Rescue Service personnel are extremely skilled and knowledgeable in relation to 
the operational aspects fire-fighting. However, unlike the structural engineering profession, 
the core education and experience of fire service personnel is not focussed on fundamental 
scientific understanding of the physical principles and their implementation within building 
design. Their education and training necessarily relate to more operational aspects of fire 
service activities.  
 
The Institution of Fire Engineers therefore has an inherent conflict within its membership. Its 
members who are current and former fire service personnel have an interest in continuing 
to be regarded as the custodians of fire safety; however, the professionally chartered fire 
engineers also have an interest in being perceived as the custodians of fire safety. One way 
for the Institution to resolve this conflict would be to maximise the number of former fire 
service personnel that are able to achieve Chartered status. However, given the 
fundamentally different educational backgrounds required for a fire-fighter and a 
professional engineer, this process requires either significant re-education of the fire-fighter, 
or a reduction in the educational requirements associated with becoming a Chartered Fire 
Engineer. The latter is a route to incompetence within the population of engineers who 
receive Chartership from the Institution of Fire Engineers.  
 
This professional competence situation is unique within the built environment because fire 
safety is the only area where there is a government-funded professional interventional 
response unit. There is no parallel “structural brigade”. If a structural engineering failure 
occurs, then structural engineers themselves are called upon to investigate. 
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• The fire safety engineer is a uniquely weak professional within the design process 
due to: the perceptions of, and strength of, the Fire and Rescue Services; and the 
presence of guidance that can remove any perceived need for a professional; 
• There is little evidential basis for judging the competency of fire safety engineering 
specialists due to the rarity of fires and the resulting minimal capacity for feedback to 





It is recommended that measures should be taken to ensure that competence is increased 
across the fire safety engineering and assessment professions. It is recommended that this 
should focus on: 
• Increasing and regulating the competence of the regulators (i.e. the Local Authority 
and the Approved Inspectors), as this would be the quickest way to both identify 
inappropriate solutions, and require professional design teams to improve their 
competence. 
• Separating the accreditation of Fire Engineers from the interests of the Fire and 
Rescue Services. While these two groups are linked, there is: 
o An inherent conflict between regulator and design professional; 
o An inherent conflict regarding which group should be the custodian of Fire 
Safety within the building design process. 
 
 
5. Testing Frameworks 
The use of tests to assess and verify the adequacy of a product is commonplace across 
many industries. Often these tests become embedded within regulatory frameworks, and 
“passing” a test becomes a route to compliance with relevant legal requirements. 
 
The fire performance of a product or system is underpinned by fundamental scientific 
concepts (e.g. heat transfer, chemistry, fluid dynamics). These fire science principles 
control how a system responds when subjected to different external stimuli (e.g. severe 
heating in a fire). Some test methods represent an attempt to reproduce the stimulus and 
the product in a way that is somehow representative of end use. The intent is that the 
results of a test can be used to infer conclusions about the performance of a product or 
system in a real situation. Naturally this requires some understanding of the likely (or “worst 
case”) situation for the external stimuli and the product or system. 
 
The alternative approach is to build up a body of fundamental fire science that allows the 
processes and parameters that govern how materials, products and systems perform to be 
understood through experimentation. When these fundamental processes are adequately 
understood, the performance of a system can be understood. This approach delivers robust 
knowledge on the performance of materials and, when adequately described, allows 
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extrapolation to new scenarios or applications. This necessarily requires detailed 
knowledge of fundamental fire science phenomena which is often lacking in the fire 
engineering community. 
 
The rationale for standardised testing is that it is not possible to know in advance all the 
phenomena (and their coupling) which govern the product or system response. These tests 
therefore seek to allow comparisons between materials rather than deliver fundamental 
understanding. While testing is undertaken on products or systems, it is ultimately the 
interactions between materials and the external stimuli that govern the fire behaviour. 
 
Designing an adequate test therefore requires detailed understanding of the fundamental 
processes such that these are adequately represented. However, because of the focus on 
regulatory testing to demonstrate compliance for prescriptive fire safety regulation, many of 
the processes governing fire behaviour are not well understood beyond laboratory 
conditions. 
 
Consequently, the interpretation of results from testing is extremely subjective. No 
fundamental knowledge can be obtained as the results are dependent on the test setup, 
which is typically inadequately defined and the results inadequately reported to allow 
scientific understanding or interrogation. To circumvent the need for full scientific 
understanding of a particular system or product, conditions are created in standardised 
tests that are believed to be sufficiently representative of reality. It is therefore claimed that 
adequate performance with the tests can be assumed to deliver adequate performance in 
reality. The potential limitations of this approach are well documented within the aerospace 
testing industry (e.g. Downer 2007). 
 
Within the context of fire safety engineering, there are many test methods that are available 
and which are cited by ADB. Test results typically lead to products being “classified” 
according to whether they achieve a particular performance in the test, and, on the basis of 
this classification, products are permitted (or not permitted) for use in buildings. 
 
The use of classification methods for categorising products is not, inherently, problematic. 
However, within the context of fire safety engineering (and the context of limited practitioner 
competence) there are particular challenges with this approach as are described below. 
5.1. Reaction to Fire 
The flammability properties of materials are controlled by a range of well understood 
scientific principles. There is a vast body of literature on ignition, burning, flame spread, and 
the parameters that control these phenomena. However, the system by which products are 
specified (or permitted) in buildings does not use fundamental material properties or 
parameters relating to the fire performance. Instead, materials and products are subjected 
to a series of tests – and based on the results of these tests, they are allocated a 
“classification”. Products are classified from A to F, and terms such as “combustible”, 
“limited combustibility”, “non-combustible” are used to describe the behaviour of the 
materials. 
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The aim of such a system is to allow classification of materials against a standard set of 
tests to determine whether (and where) they can be used in a building. Although these 
terms are adequately defined, they do not necessarily capture the true characteristics of 
how a material burns (material flammability, and dependence on the fire environment) and 
subsequently it is extremely difficult (and perhaps impossible) to extrapolate product 
classifications to an understanding of the risks posed when assembled into a construction 
system.  
 
The absence of quantitative behaviour characteristics means that for practitioners, there is 
little incentive to acquire or retain knowledge of the fundamental physical processes that 
affect fire spread or development. Hence, even where knowledge of the actual risks of 
particular products or systems is required, many practitioners are unable to adequately 
comprehend the relevant processes. 
 
So long as the test design is sufficiently realistic, this lack of fundamental knowledge 
gathered from material testing is not a problem per se for prescriptive regulation, but it 
creates an inherent disconnect between the regulatory system and any “first principles” 
engineering. The absence of quantitative behaviour data might mean that there is a 
challenge in undertaking design of solutions other than those presented in ADB; and it may 





It is recommended that the testing regime should be updated to include fundamental 
parameters, and quantification of the testing environment in the classification of materials. 
This would allow engineering judgements to be made, and would embed within the 
regulatory system an inherent value to understanding the fundamental principles. 
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5.2. Fire Resistance Ratings 
The fire resistance ratings provided within Approved Document B represent the period of 
time that an element of structure or compartmentation is expected to survive within a 
standard furnace test. The furnace test is a historical testing method that is now deeply 
embedded within codes and standards around the world. The procedure of furnace testing 
involves the exposure of the test specimen to a mixture of hot gases within a well insulated 
closed chamber, and the measurement of performance against various discrete, 
quantifiable “acceptance criteria” e.g. temperature rise on the unexposed face, leakage of 
flame or hot gas, structural deflection, collapse, etc. The time of failure in the tests (typically 
rounded down to the nearest 30 minute interval) is the tested “period of fire resistance” of 
the element of construction. 
 
The fire resistance test is also the product of a compromise between representativeness 
and reproducibility – and the shortcomings of such tests are well documented within the 
technical literature (Bisby, 2013). Irrespective of these shortcomings, this system of testing 
and fire resistance rating provides a clear and objective method for classifying types of 
construction.  
 
The standard fire resistance test suffers from similar issues as the combustibility tests. The 
test method obscures many of the fundamental phenomena that govern structural 
behaviour during a fire and therefore it can be difficult (if not impossible) for practitioners to 
develop and retain an understanding of the governing physics based on the results of these 
test. 
 
Furthermore, the furnace tests, and the fire resistance classification system suffer from an 
additional problem. The period of fire resistance of an element of construction in a furnace 
test is often confused/conflated with the time to failure in a real fire. This confusion is rooted 
in a misunderstanding (or lack of understanding) of the background history and origins of 
the test method and the resulting classification system, and a failure of individuals to 
recognise that conditions in a real fire differ – sometimes very significantly – from those in a 
standard furnace test. 
 
This confusion is problematic for several reasons: 
• False comfort. Conflation of furnace time and real time can falsely lead people to 
assume that elements of construction will provide a level of performance that, in fact, 
they do not (in a real fire). This can, and does, lead to decisions about evacuation or 
fire-fighting that are not based on sound technical reasoning. 
• Additive fire resistance. The use of “minutes” as a measure of performance can lead 
people to assume that periods of fire resistance are additive (e.g. two 30 layers of 
protection are equivalent to one 60 minute layer of protection). This is an incorrect 
assumption and can lead practitioners to provide construction that has a level of 
performance substantially less than that intended by Approved Document B. 
• Actual performance intent. The use of “minutes” of fire resistance can lead people to 
assume that failure after this time is acceptable. This is not necessarily the case and 
was not the historical basis upon which this testing and classification system was 
devised. The original intent of high periods of fire resistance (particularly for tall 
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buildings) was to ensure that construction could endure complete burnout of all the 
fuel within the fire compartment. This misunderstanding can lead people to adopt 
solutions for high rise buildings that might not be able to resist burnout of the fuel 





It is recommended to update the classification system for fire resistance rating that is used 
within the Approved Document B. Rather than using “minutes of fire resistance”, it is 
recommended that the Approved Document should adopt a “fire grading” classification 
system. For example, Grade A construction, Grade B, Grade C etc. These can then be 
mapped against appropriate standard test results. 
 
This classification approach would change the language associated with ‘fire resistance’. 
The change in language would be an explicit acknowledgement that “fire resistance 
periods” do not equate to time in a real fire, and would discourage people from casually or 
technically making this flawed comparison. 
 
6. Evidence of Adequacy 
This document has discussed the various technical and social factors that regulate and 
deliver fire safety within the built environment. There are two methods to “close the loop” 
and evidence the adequacy (or otherwise) of the fire safety within the built environment: (1) 
statistical evidence; and (2) physical evidence from fires. 
6.1. Statistical Evidence 
Analysis of statistics makes clear that there has been a reduction in the number of fires 
(large fires are not a common experience in society). The cause of this decrease is far from 
trivial to identify; however this suggests that fires have become harder (and less likely) to 
ignite than previously. These trends at least partly coincide with the introduction of The 
Furniture and Furnishings (Fire) (Safety) Regulations 1988 (and subsequent amendments). 
 
However, additional statistics available from the insurance industry suggest that the 
average cost of a fire claim has increased suggesting that the damage occurs when a fire is 
ignited is increasing. This may be in part indicative of an increased tendency for fire spread 
from the compartment of origin. 
 
The complexities of the interactions between the building regulations and their interface 
with other regulations (e.g. furniture fire safety) mean that it is not simple to identify whether 
the building regulations are sufficiently robust and reliable in maximising fire safety. It is 
acknowledged that these statistics are incomplete, and that it is difficult to draw definitive 
conclusions due to the evolution of the built environment, responsibilities of professionals 
(and professional bodies) etc.  
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6.2. Evidence from Real Fires 
There is no requirement for fire investigations (either those carried out by the FRS or in the 
private sector) to identify the mechanisms of fire growth, spread and development. 
Consequently, there is no requirement for direct ‘feedback’ from the observations on fire 
scenes to lead to revisions in the regulations – although large numbers of casualties 
typically trigger revisions.  
 
While the FRS have the statutory power to undertake an investigation into the origin, cause 
and development of a fire, they do not have a statutory duty to do so. Private fire 
investigations (e.g. those carried out on instruction by insurance companies) may be 






It is recommended that the requirements for and duties related to investigation of fires are 
re-assessed. Detailed fire investigations, and open reporting, will allow evaluation (on a 
rolling basis) of where there are deficiencies or misunderstanding of the regulations to be 
identified. This must be undertaken by a competent individual and the FRS may not be the 
appropriate body to undertake this task. 
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7. Updates to Existing Guidance 
The previous discussion has identified that the guidance provided in ADB is “fail safe” in 
that any ambiguity can be corrected by reference to the intent of the document. However, it 
has also been identified that, in many cases, the individuals responsible for interpreting the 
document or checking that the document has been followed are not competent to do so. 
 
Consequently, there are aspects of the document where additional guidance would provide 
clarity, and prevent unsafe practices from occurring. Suggestions are made in the following 
section. It should be noted that these suggestions are not intended to be comprehensive, 
but represent areas where the authors have knowledge and experience. 
7.1. Subdivision of B4 
B4 captures the requirements for external fire spread. There are two aspects of external fire 
spread that are defined: 
• Fire spread on the external walls of the building; and 
• Fire spread from one building to another.  
 
These two aspects are thematically linked. However, it would be possible to express these 
as two different requirements. This would potentially enable a more explicit identification of 
the fire safety measures provided to achieve each objective. This approach is already 
adopted for internal fire spread (which is split into B2 and B3) – it would therefore be in-line 





It is recommended that B4 (External Fire Spread) should be further sub-divided to define 
separate functional requirements associated to: 
• Spread over the walls; and 
• Spread from one building to another. 
 
The benefit of this is that it would facilitate more explicit definition within the fire safety 
strategy (and associated approval discussions) of the intent of the fire safety measures 
within the building. 
 
7.2. Curtain Walls 
Curtain walls are panelized cladding systems that hang from the perimeter of the building. 
The detailing of the junction between the curtain wall, and the floor slab is mentioned in 
ADB clause 8.26 as follows: 
 
At the junction of a compartment floor with an external wall that has no fire resistance (such 
as a curtain wall) the external wall should be restrained at floor level to reduce the 
movement of the wall away from the floor when exposed to fire.  
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The intent of this section is to provide compartmentation in order to “prevent rapid fire 
spread which could trap occupants of the building” and “reduce the chance of fires 
becoming large”. 
 
From this it would be reasonable to infer that some kind of fire protection measure is 
provided at these details. However, this raises the more fundamental question of “where is 
the edge of the building?”, and do these systems potentially introduce a route for vertical 
fire spread. For example, some curtain wall assemblies have a 2-hour fire stopping detail 
abutted to external glazing; clarification on whether these typologies of detail adequately 





It is recommended that additional guidance should be provided with respect to the interface 
between compartment walls and floors, and curtain walling. 
 
 
7.3. Mass Timber Buildings 
Cross-laminated timber is increasingly becoming a popular form of construction within the 
UK. This form of construction has large timber panels that form the walls and floors of a 
building; these are exposed within a room, or “encapsulated” with fire protection material 
(typically gypsum plasterboard).  
 
The fire resistance ratings in ADB are based on an assumed fuel load within a given 
occupancy of building, and intended to allow the burnout of that fuel. In non-combustible 
construction (e.g. steel or concrete) the structure of the building makes no contribution to 
that fuel load. In the case of mass timber buildings, any exposed timber will burn – and 
therefore contribute to the overall fuel of the fire. Furthermore, where timber elements are 
exposed (or become exposed due to fall-off of the encapsulation) there is no guarantee that 
these will stop burning once the original fuel load (i.e. furniture) is consumed. 
Consequently, it is possible that mass timber buildings may continue to burn until structural 
failure occurs. 
 
A thorough understanding of Approved Document B and its underlying assumptions 
(including the functional requirements of the Building Regulations 2010) would lead any 
reader to the conclusion that additional checks (beyond those expressed in Table A2 of 
ADB) are required to enable the use of mass timber construction. These checks would 
account for the additional fuel load that could be liberated from the mass timber, and ensure 
that “self-extinction” of the timber occurs following consumption of the fuel load. 
 
However, there are an increasing number of project examples where these aspects have 
not been considered during design. It is recommended that additional clarity should 
therefore be provided within Approved Document B to ensure that adequate checks are 
made. 
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It is recommended that Approved Document B should be updated with language to suggest 
that: 
 
In the case of mass timber construction, it should not be assumed that the values provided 
in Table A2 are guaranteed to meet the requirement. Additional checks should be 
completed as appropriate to ensure that the fuel load associated with mass timber 
construction is incorporated into the design and that, if appropriate, any involved timber 
linings are able to cease flaming without fire service intervention. 
 
This would ensure that any future mass timber buildings are able to deliver a level of 
performance commensurate with that achieved in other contemporary forms of 
construction. 
 
7.4. The Role of BS 9999 
BS9999 is a “new” code which provides an approach to prescriptive design that is 
orientated around risk profiles derived from classes of occupancy characteristics and fire 
growth rates. 
 
This standard provides a broader range of solutions than those provided in ADB. It also 
requires that the designer make explicit judgements about aspects of the building. For 
example, decisions about fire growth rates (and the possibility of the impact of change of 
use). 
 
As with ADB, this demands competence from the designer and regulator.  
 
There are two issues where it is suggested that changes may be appropriate with the use of 
BS 9999. First, it would be appropriate to integrate this into ADB (the latest 2013 edition 
makes no reference at all to BS 9999, which came into force in 2008, and much of the BS 
5588 series was withdrawn on 6 April 2009). Second, queries have been raised about the 
justifications for ratings provided in Tables 26 and 27 of BS 9999. The concept of this 
approach is clear and it could, in principle, provide an important route to further engineering 
analysis of the appropriate fire resistance periods. However, no justification is given for the 
conditions cited in Table 27. It may be that more fundamental work is needed in this area 
and some revisions required. 
 
In relation to the differentiation between building classifications, BS 9999 specifically 
addresses some issues that overlap high-rise/multi-occupancy residential buildings, e.g. in 
Annex Q. It may be useful if these issues were addressed in a separate code, though 
problematic given the need for duplication of some of the fundamental concepts. 
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It is recommended that ADB should be updated to include reference to BS 9999. In 
addition, it is recommended that supporting information should be included with respect to 
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